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 Abstract 
 
Interest group regulation in European governance is crucial to a full understanding of 
how power is exercised within the European Union (EU) and for a more accurate 
description of how the EU political system functions (and of its underlying principles). 
One of the main issues here is how private or specific interests engage with a general or 
public interest embodied in one way or another by those acting for the EU. Given the 
range of sensitive issues at stake, it is hardly surprising that the question of regulation 
meets with considerable resistance, especially in the Commission. However, recent 
obstacles to European integration have had the effect of relaunching a debate that makes 
ethics and transparency core parts of the agenda. Current political dynamics seem to 
testify to a growing EU receptiveness to the claims of the ALTER-EU movement which 
seeks a more highly regulated environment for EU lobbyists and officials. 
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INTRODUCTION: ATTEMPT AT REGULATION: A PATH FULL OF 
PITFALLS 
 
Following the 1986 Single European Act in 1986, the EU began attracting lobbyists in 
substantially larger numbers, sometimes to the point where they would interfere with 
parliamentarians‟ work and damage the institutions.1 In May 1991, the Committee on the 
Rules of Procedures, the Verification of Credentials and Immunities invited Belgian 
Member of the European Parliament (MEP) Marc Galle to submit proposals to address 
this problem. The report which Marc Galle filed in October 1992 defined lobbyists2 in 
considerable detail and recommended that the Parliament draw up a code of conduct for 
them, restrict them to areas separate from MEPs‟ offices and, above all, compel them to 
enroll in a register available to the public. For the first time, an official EU document 
raised the possibility of regulation and supervision of lobbying activities. It proposed that 
the register should in particular specify “the activities developed to influence Members of 
the European Parliament directly or via staff or assistants, and the budgets involved in it” 
(European Parliament, 1992: 4). Persons complying with these requirements would then 
be provided with a renewable annual pass and access to parliamentary facilities.  
Two other recommendations targeted the European Parliament and its personnel: 
“To ensure that Members of parliament meet the same standards of transparency that 
Parliament requires of lobbyists, Members should be required to update their declaration 
of financial interests at least annually. A register of financial interest of members‟ staff 
should also be introduced forthwith” (European Parliament, 1992: 6). In attempting to 
regulate both lobbyists and parliamentary assistants – thereby implying that there were at 
least potential conflicts of interest between the two categories that required specific 
provisions – the Galle report provoked opposition on a broad front and finally became a 
dead letter, not even being debated in plenary session.  
After the June 1994 European elections, the question of regulating lobbyists‟ 
activities once more came to the fore. In November that year, British Labour MEP Glyn 
Ford was commissioned to report on „lobbying in the European Parliament.‟ A series of 
measures contained in his draft report suggested restricting pass holders‟ access to the 
Parliament: in particular, areas in which members‟ and officials‟ offices were situated 
were to be kept private, except for the holders of a written invitation; and a badge clearly 
specifying the type of interest represented was to be worn by lobbyists at all times. These 
two measures were far from innocuous: the first would have hampered considerably 
physical interaction between MEPs and pressure groups, and the second would undercut 
the privacy and discretion that lobbyists are often so attached to. Most importantly, a 
clause relating specifically to parliamentary assistants was introduced, so that they would 
have been obliged to sign a written declaration that they neither represented nor 
supported any interests other than those linked to their official post. Thus their 
accreditation depended on compliance with this provision which, had it been put into 
effect, would have cleared up one of the principal grey areas in parliamentary work by 
making a clear distinction between its strictly political side, limited to accredited 
assistants, and the striving for influence by different groups among the entourage of 
MEPs and their teams.  
These measures seemed all the more restrictive as another project – the so-called 
Nordmann report – was drawing up at the same time proposals for declarations of interest 
by MEPs. The proposals put forward were draconian, including detailed public 
declaration of Members‟ financial situations in the form of disclosure of all assets of 
movable and immovable property, including bank accounts. As for pressure groups, all 
gifts in cash or kind provided to MEPs over 1,000 Ecus were to be declared, opening the 
way for a cross-referencing process that would constitute a means of checking that the 
information provided by MEPs accorded with that supplied by lobbyists. In plenary 
session on 17 January 1996, both reports were rejected (after stormy debate) and sent 
back to the Committee on the Rules of Procedure. Working groups and commissions 
were formed, and new versions of the Ford and Nordmann reports (with their most 
controversial proposals excised) were finally adopted by the Parliament on 17 July 1996.3 
Henceforth every MEP had to declare in a public register his or her professional activities 
and any other remunerated functions additional to their parliamentary role. Furthermore 
they must refuse any gift, payment or benefit which might influence their vote. Regarding 
the declaration of personal property, no special obligations were imposed. All in all, this 
was no mean set of rules, establishing a framework of basic transparency that had not 
existed before (but without serious sanctions for breaches). 
Lastly, since 2003, a record of accredited public and private interest groups can be 
accessed online. The value to groups of such accreditation stems not from the paucity of 
information that this process demands from them,4 but from the fact that registration 
carries entitlement to a parliamentary pass,5 valid for a maximum of one year but 
renewable on demand and providing access to and freedom of movement within the 
parliamentary precincts. Until recently this was a mere formality, with requests being 
granted almost as a matter of course and with no checks on the back-up information.6 
Given the on-going increase in the number of lobbyists seeking this authorization, the 
rules have tended over time to toughen up and become more restrictive.7 A major 
consequence of this change is the very significant decline in the number of organizations 
registered, from 2,136 in August 2005 to 1,407 in March 2007 (Berkhout and Lowery, 
2008). 
As far as parliamentary assistants wanting accreditation are concerned, they must 
simply make a written declaration of their professional activities or other functions, 
which means that there is no explicit principle of incompatibility between their status and 
the defending of private interests. The issue of gifts and/or benefits in kind is ignored and 
the practice thus not expressly forbidden. 
 
INTERGROUPS: A BLIND SPOT IN PARLIAMENTARY LIFE 
 
During the same period, the Parliament was also trying for closer supervision of 
lobbyists‟ activities through the intergroups, a relatively informal but nonetheless crucial 
element of the life of the European Parliament (Costa, 2001: 344-9). At key stages in 
European integration certain intergroups played a decisive part: the Kangaroo Club in the 
implementation of the Single Market in 1992; and the Crocodile Club, created to back the 
construction of a federal Europe. As focal points for encounters and debates between 
agents of influence and MEPs, they contributed to the process of drafting legislation. 
Initially few in number, they increased markedly after the Single European Act of 1986 
and then grew in line with the extension of parliamentary competences. In January 1991, 
this proliferation led the Parliament to take a number of not especially restrictive 
measures aimed more at providing the intergroups with reception and working facilities 
comparable to those of the political groups – excluding those of the Secretariat General –
 and stipulating that they not use the parliamentary logo. In October 1995 these rules 
were reinforced, placing the functioning of the intergroups under the direct responsibility 
of the political groups. 
 On more than one occasion, the president of the Parliament and/or the presidents 
of the political groups (meeting as the Conference of Presidents8) pronounced in favor of 
greater intergroup transparency and expressed the wish that their status be integrated into 
the Ford Report, then being drawn up (Dutoit, 2001: 32-3). But having already escaped 
the regulation provided for in the (aborted) version of the Galle report, the intergroups 
then vanished from the final version of the Ford report. A few years later the Parliament 
made another try at disciplining and limiting the extent of the intergroup phenomenon, 
and in 1996 Mark Spiers MEP found himself given the task of examining intergroup 
status, notably with a view to endowing them with a transparent financing mode. The 
initial draft legislation, dated 20 March 1997, proposed a rigorous monitoring system 
aimed at real transparency. An intergroup was defined as a grouping of European 
parliamentarians from at least three member states and three political groups, who discuss 
issues relating to the work of the Parliament and having to do with the EU‟s fields of 
activity (European Parliament, 1997). This wide-ranging definition embraced not only 
groups active within the Parliament – as had been the case until then – but all those 
matching the stated criteria, wherever the meetings took place. The intergroups were to 
be subject to strict obligations including a request that formation be authorized, reporting 
of any changes of composition and a public decoration of any external aid received. 
In marked contrast with the toothless existing measures, these stringent measures 
were judged too ambitious and rejected by the Committee on Legal Affairs. A second 
draft was put forward on 9 July 1998; stripped of all the clauses relating to the definition 
of an intergroup, it settled for specifying that intergroups must be registered with the 
Quaestors [a group of six MEPS who are responsible for administrative and financial 
issues relating to members]. But it too was rejected. A third version omitted all reference 
to the intergroups as such, merely mentioning „groupings of Members‟ subject to the 
rules applying to Members as individuals. Placed under the control of the political 
groups, they were simply required to register with the Quaestors, without their existence 
being made public. Finally adopted on 18 February 1999, the Spiers report is strikingly 
hollow. More than three years‟ work had not been enough to enable a minimum of 
transparency and effective regulation of the way intergroups were organized.  
 The debacle having been duly noted, on 16 December 1999 the Conference of 
Presidents decided to subject formation of intergroups to stricter, more selective, criteria 
(European Parliament, 1999). In particular, intergroup projects were to be signed by at 
least three political groups, each group having a number of signatures limited in 
accordance with its size. Arbitrarily a maximum of 25 intergroups was authorized, 
entailing de facto the disappearance of many of them.9 Moreover, in a move against 
certain rapprochements with foreign states or peoples, intergroups “likely to have an 
adverse effect on relations with the other Institutions of the Union or relations with non-
member countries” were banned (European Parliament, 1999: Article 3).10 The rules of 
transparency were likewise tightened up, the list of members and the raison d’être of 
each intergroup having to appear in a register accessible to the public. At the practical 
level, strict rules were applied to the availability of rooms and time slots for meetings. 
 These measures had tangible results, leading certain intergroups to merge in order 
to obtain the necessary authorization from the political groups. The new regulations made 
their existence official, rationalizing their modus operandi and thus favoring the most 
efficiently structured of them. This process of institutionalization acted as a filter, 
resulting in enhanced influence for a small number of intergroups. By contrast other 
interest groups decided to pull out of their intergroups, judging the regulations too 
restrictive. One example was the extremely powerful International Automobile 
Federation/International Touring Alliance, which in 1998 withdrew from the Automobile 
Users intergroup – causing its disbandment – and opted for organizing meetings outside 
the parliamentary precincts (and thus immune from all monitoring) (Dutoit, 2002). In this 
sense the effect of the standards imposed was the opposite of that intended: supervision 
and transparency of lobbying activities. Thus the existence of formal rules does not 
always mean they will be put into effect or produce the sought effects. As it happens, 
regulation of the intergroups has only been partially implemented, since the publicly 
accessible register intended to list intergroups and their members has still to make its 
appearance. Only a few specialists in European affairs working from parliamentary 
documents can put together a list of existing intergroups and their presidents, the political 
groups that sponsor them and the date of their creation;11 but even then, none of the 
information reveals the identity of the MEPs and lobbyists participating in intergroup 
meetings. 
 In the final analysis the incredible difficulty involved in having the regulations 
passed and the practical aspects of getting access to available information12 point to major 
resistance. It is significant, too, that the sanctions for non-compliance seem largely virtual 
and ineffective. Despite these shortcomings, the creation of a system of regulation and 
supervision of lobbying bespeaks a political will – extremely slow-moving, often 
thwarted and faced with multiple inertias – specific to the Parliament. At present, the 
Parliament is the only European institution to possess a procedure for the obligatory 
registration and accreditation of pressure groups. As such it appears extremely isolated 
and largely out of phase with the Commission‟s concerns. Unlike the Parliament, whose 
operation is based on the sacred „elected member‟ – and which is thus responsible to its 
electors for the way in which it exercises its mandate (Schaber, 1998) – the Commission 
is above all an administrative institution that has always made receptiveness to interest 
groups one of its hallmarks. Not being a product of universal suffrage, and as the target of 
repeated attacks for its famous democratic deficit, the Commission has opted for multiple 
consultation and participation procedures and so bases its decisions and the 
implementation of European public policy on unrivalled expertise – it fights for a 
„Europe of results‟ – in the hope of establishing a legitimacy alternative to that of 
national political systems (Scharpf, 1999). It has so far opposed a strict, compulsory and 
binding system of lobbying regulation, while espousing transparency in its relations with 
representatives of European civil society. In this way it avoids the trap of excessively 
detailed and rigid rules which, for example, could render it dependent on certain member 
states;13 and above all it constantly broadens its range of expertise and arms itself with a 
highly competitive economic policy. This doctrine goes back a long way, being clearly 
stated in the preparatory work on the setting up of the Single Market (Sutherland, 1992). 
Thus the creation of an interest group register covering both the Parliament and the 
Commission, with those listed subject to the same obligations – a project which was 
officially suggested by the Commission at one time – now looks somewhat unrealistic, 
and the profound divergence of approach between the two bodies to date in this respect is 
unmistakable.  
 
THE ‘ORGANIZED EUROPEAN CIVIL SOCIETY’ 
 
At the same time as the Parliament was striving to curb lobbying within its precincts, the 
Commission continued to encourage the practice, pointing to its desire for dialogue with 
the driving forces of European civil society (European Commission, 2002). It declined to 
impose compulsory registration or accreditation on pressure groups, arguing that 
pluralism demands that influence not be the prerogative of any organization in particular. 
Although access to the Commission reflects selective bias (Balme and Chabanet, 2002), 
this principle of openness resulted in the creation of formal consultation procedures in 
which a very broad range of groups played a vital part. Equally, though, the expansion of 
lobbying is forcing the Commission to select a number of privileged interlocutors, even if 
this functionalist approach is not always made explicit. This approach aims to facilitate 
the decision-making process, to improve the quality of lobbying, and to establish the 
efficacy of the NGO subsidy system which has been gradually developed via partnerships 
(European Commission, 2000). 
The tension between receptivity towards interest groups on the one hand, and 
rationalization of consultation procedures on the other14 was resolved via some acrobatics 
with the notion of „organized European civil society,‟ which enabled the Commission to 
regulate its functioning as an interface with interest groups while continuing to promote 
the idea of broad, equitable and transparent participation. Very strict criteria were drawn 
up by the Economic and Social Committee and used by the Commission:  
 
In order to be eligible, a European organization must: exist permanently at 
Community level; provide direct access to its members‟ expertise and 
hence rapid and constructive consultation; represent general concerns that 
tally with the interests of European society; comprise bodies that are 
recognized at Member State level as representative of particular interests; 
have member organizations in most of the EU Member States; provide for 
accountability to its members; have authority to represent and act at 
European level; be independent and mandatory, not bound by instructions 
from outside bodies; be transparent especially financially and in its 
decision-making structures (Economic and Social Committee, 2002: 5-6). 
 
For some time, scholars have noted the nature of the bias implicit in the selection 
process and, above all, the apparent arbitrariness governing European institutions‟ choice 
of interlocutors, in particular to the detriment of civic and social interests. The 
Commission in fact partly subscribes to this analysis and “has played a role in 
encouraging NGOs to regroup into umbrella organizations and to develop common 
networks across borders within the European Union, given that these forms of 
collaboration streamline the consultation process” (European Commission, 2000: 2). It 
has also recommended that they adopt a transparent modus operandi and contribute to the 
democratization of the public arena. These requirements certainly enhance the dialogue 
the Commission is so keen on, but do also serve to make consultation procedures more 
rigid and to reinforce their selectivity.  
CONECCS (the database for Consultation, the European Commission and Civil 
Society, and an umbrella for non-profit organizations) has been seen as a concrete 
expression of the Commission‟s desire to provide the public with better information 
about its consultation processes.15 Established in 2003, it replaced the old interest groups 
list and marked a step toward transparency. The information provided to CONECCS was 
detailed and (crucially) was checked by officials, and so it offered a relatively 
comprehensive picture of the activity of the groups concerned.16 While the database was 
voluntary and inclusion in no way constituted an official seal of approval, the distinction 
it made between „consultative bodies‟ and other „civil society organizations‟ strongly 
suggested that dialogue is becoming increasingly selective, is relatively stabilized and 
indicative of a corporatist system. In April 2006 the first category comprised 141 groups 
and the second 706, offering a fairly nuanced picture of the most influential European 
civil society actors structured by and around the Commission. While providing no form 
of accreditation, the database filtered rigorously, allowing through those organizations 
deemed by the Commission to be „open and responsible.‟ The information it required of 
groups allowed the Commission to assess groups‟ capacity to meet the criteria of 
transparency, competence and representativeness, and thus to form a seedbed from which 
actors could be selected to participate in specifically orientated consultation procedures. 
As Justin Greenwood argues, “The CONECCS database is a de facto accreditation 
scheme in waiting, despite the Commission‟s wish to the contrary. Such schemes, when 
invested with regulatory power, typically act as a stimulus for the re-organization of the 
interest group landscape, with fewer but larger groups, and „families‟ of NGOs” (quoted 
by EurActiv.com, 2004). 
 
TRANSPARENCY AS A KEY ISSUE: WHEN THE COMMISSION MEETS 
ALTER-EU CLAIMS 
 
The rise of Euro-skepticism – reflected most starkly in the French and Dutch „No‟ to the 
proposed European Constitution in April 2005 – inaugurated a period of uncertainty. 
Weakened by this situation, which left the EU‟s political future in abeyance – but also by 
the entry of ten new member states which fuelled widespread public fears – the 
Commission tried again to restart the integration process. In a highly unfavorable 
environment and very much aware of its shaky democratic status, it embarked on an 
enormous program of self-legitimation, emphasizing more than ever the cachet of its 
consultation/communication services in the hope of winning round public opinion 
(European Commission, 2006b). In a way, then, the Commission has made transparency, 
efficacy and the ethics of public action core elements of the European agenda and used 
them as the basis for specific discourses and measures.17 The key aspect here is to note 
that the transparency of European institutions and the regulation of lobbying are 
simultaneously the cause of the emergence of a new alter-European actor and the 
framework for the construction of the Commission‟s agenda.  
 The ALTER-EU movement – the Alliance for Lobbying Transparency and Ethics 
Regulation – has gradually been taking shape since late 2004, its main weapon being the 
denunciation of collusion between business and European decision-making elites. It 
brings together the traditional alter-globalist actors (such as ATTAC, the Association for 
the Taxation of Financial Transactions to Aid Citizens, which campaigns against 
neoliberal economic globalization, for fair trade and in defense of public services) with 
Eurogroups generally representing civic or social interests that see themselves as 
mistreated by the current EU governance model, and journalists‟ associations (notably the 
European Federation of Journalists) concerned about the influence of pressure groups on 
the media. In contrast with the usual alter-globalist mobilizations, the interaction here 
between Europe‟s governing elites and their challengers is direct and internalized, in the 
sense that it is taking place in a shared institutional space. Determination to counter the 
atmosphere of Euro-skepticism represents a window of opportunity for the ALTER-EU 
movement, whose leaders regularly meet with high-ranking Commission staff and the 
Commissioners themselves. Largely designed as an information network, ALTER-EU 
makes enormous use of the Internet to put an extremely precise and well-documented 
case, grounded in research and often couched in humorous or satirical terms. Its way of 
working is systematized enough to suggest a strategic positioning likely to catch the eye 
of Internet surfers and a broad audience.18 Its aim is to solicit the attention of a public 
with no specialist knowledge of European issues, while setting itself apart from the great 
mass of information circulating online and steering clear of the jargon and hermetic style 
usually employed by EU institutions. Just as social movements with little political or 
institutional backing specialize in spectacular activities intended to grab the attention of 
the media and the public, ALTER-EU has opted for a distinctly original style of action 
and argument, with humor and ridicule as its favorite weapons.  
It proposes a binding system of compulsory regulation applicable to all special 
interest categories – although exceptions would be made for unstructured groups with 
limited resources (no office in Brussels, for example) for which it argues the demand for 
a declaration of activity and/or transparency obligations would involve disproportionately 
heavy administrative costs. Since late 2004, ALTER-EU has set up a dense program 
which has influenced the Commission‟s thinking on lobbying regulation and the 
transparency of European institutions. The most striking proposals relate to the 
establishment of an independent body with the powers needed to act as a public guardian 
of lobbying transparency and ethics; for lobbyists, a mandatory system of electronic 
registration and reporting to ensure transparency in EU decision-making (including the 
names of their clients); Rules of Conduct for lobbyists and EU officials, notably 
including a „revolving door‟ system imposing a period of transition before any move 
from the private sector to posts of responsibility within the Commission and vice versa; 
and an obligatory Declaration of Personal Financial Interest. Furthermore, it argues that 
immediate family members of a covered official should be prohibited from lobbying for 
payment the agency in which the covered official serves; that lobbyists and their clients 
should be banned from offering gifts with a value of more than €150; and that for each 
policy proposal the European Commission should publish a list of organizations it has 
consulted (ALTER-EU, 2006). 
This work program deserves attention in that it represents the background to the 
European Transparency Initiative, officially launched in March 2005 by Siim Kallas, the 
Vice-President of the European Commission and Commissioner for Administrative 
Affairs, Audit and Anti-Fraud. His speech to the Nottingham Business School largely 
drew on ALTER-EU‟s demands and its alarmist (not to say vehement) tone. Stressing the 
majority of citizens‟ loss of confidence in the EU, Kallas announced a set of measures 
aimed at reversing this position and intimated the possibility of both EU legislation and 
recommendations to the member states on the issue of lobbying regulation (Kallas, 2005). 
In his speech, Kallas called for greater transparency and stricter ethical standards on the 
part of lobbyists, and for more openness and accountability on the part of the EU 
institutions. 
Lobbyists‟ associations – the Society of European Affairs Professionals (SEAP) 
and the Association of Accredited Lobbyists to the European Parliament (AALEP) – 
reacted sharply to this initiative, arguing that their existing codes of conduct provided 
adequate safeguards and that their contribution to European democratic life should not be 
interfered with. They also asserted that a more restrictive system would hamper civic and 
social interest groups, for whom access to European spheres would be rendered even 
more difficult. The existence of several such organizations representing lobbyists – 
mostly very recent, displaying no distinctive ideological differences, and embracing only 
100 or so mainly Commission-oriented groups – might seem surprising in that 
fragmentation would seem to weaken lobbyists‟ collective position and capacity for 
influence. In fact the situation presents a number of advantages: each professional 
association can claim to speak on behalf of a particular constituency and so enjoy a 
significant place in the public micro-space made up by the European institutions. At the 
same time they do not have to submit to the rules of a representative body, the latter 
being considered a „vital interlocutor‟ and so obliged to work on binding rules and 
ultimately impose them on its members. Here private sector interest groups can put 
together all the Codes of Conduct, Codes of Ethics and Codes of Practice they like, 
without getting too involved in formal consultation procedures that might turn out to be 
restrictive, while still enjoying freedom of expression and a real right to a hearing.19 
Significantly, they riposted by creating, on 28 January 2005, a new organization – the 
European Public Affairs Consultancies Association (EPACA) – whose task it was to 
draw up a new code of conduct while defending the principle of self-regulation for the 
profession.  
Publication of a Green Paper on the European Transparency Initiative (European 
Commission, 2006a), alongside a public consultation exercise, showed that the issue 
under consideration has never been set so directly at the core of the European political 
agenda. The Commission itself acknowledges having “launched a review of its overall 
approach to transparency,” with an explicit emphasis on “the need for a more structured 
framework for the activities of interest representatives” (European Commission, 2006a: 
3). The responses received during the consultation were published (European 
Commission, 2007), and an overview of the issues raised in the debate can be found in 
Spencer and McGrath (2006). Partisans of strict regulation were disappointed to find that 
the Commission ultimately chose to postpone compulsory registration for interest groups: 
“A tighter system of self-regulation would appear more appropriate. However, after a 
certain period, a review should be conducted to examine whether self-regulation has 
worked. If not, consideration could be given to a system of compulsory measures – a 
compulsory code of conduct plus compulsory registration” (European Commission, 
2006a: 10). With its plan for a web-based voluntary system with (minor) incentives to 
register for all lobbyists who wish to be consulted on EU initiatives (European 
Commission, 2006a: 8) the Commission is aiming at making public the activities of all 
interest groups – think-tanks, companies specializing in European affairs, legal 
consultancies, employer organizations, etc – that do not appear in the CONNECS 
database and which currently operate for the most part in secret. The effectiveness of the 
rules of transparency was also slated for improvement, with plans for an independent 
authority in charge of monitoring the system and imposing sanctions in cases of 
misleading registration and/or violation of a code of professional ethics ultimately 
applicable to all lobbyists. Such a system would provide the general public with a fairly 
comprehensive information tool, one enabling a better understanding of the rationale of 
representation of European interests and at least partial clarification of the EU decision-
making process. 
In May 2008, the Commission published a Communication which set out how the 
system of registration would operate and included a new Code of Conduct for Interest 
Representatives (European Commission, 2008a). For the purposes of this system, the 
Commission expects that any organization engaged in interest representation – defined as 
“activities carried out with the objective of influencing the policy formulation and 
decision-making processes of the European institutions” (European Commission, 2008a: 
3) – to register. Registrants must agree to adhere to the provisions of the Code of 
Conduct, and breaches of the Code will result in an organization being suspended 
temporarily or excluded from the register. The Code contains seven key rules, none of 
them particularly difficult for any organization which behaves ethically to begin with. 
They require that lobbyists: identify themselves and the organization they represent when 
approaching EU officials; ensure that they do not mislead officials; declare the interests 
they seek to represent; provide unbiased and accurate information; do not obtain 
information dishonestly; do not attempt to get officials to act unethically; and respect the 
confidentiality requirements which must be met by any former officials now employed by 
them. The register, which was launched on 23 June 2008, is freely available online 
(European Commission, 2008b), and as of 4 August 2008 it listed 234 interest 
representatives (under four headings: professional consultancies/law firms involved in 
lobbying EU institutions; „in-house‟ lobbyists and trade associations active in lobbying; 
NGO/think-tank; and other organizations). Immediate reaction to the register was less 
than overwhelmingly favorable – many of the large lobbying consultancies are 
considering the implications of registration (for example, EPACA advised its members to 
wait until after the association meets in September to discuss the scheme); law firms are 
concerned that registration could conflict with their requirements for client 
confidentiality; trade associations fear that registering would have tax implications for 
them under Belgium law; and ALTER-EU has criticized the register as simply a token 
gesture given that it names organizations but not individual lobbyists (Hall, 2008). The 
register will operate for 12 months before its effectiveness is reviewed by the 
Commission. 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
The Parliament and the Commission have historically followed largely competing lines 
of conduct, the former laboriously establishing a compulsory system of registration, and 
the latter – in favor of self-regulation – settling for incentive measures. Given the 
intensification of lobbying since the early 1990s and, even more importantly, the EU‟s 
political fragility and democratic deficit, the issue is now a crucial one. In this context, 
the Commission cannot afford the risk of a case of corruption, or even a scandal, which 
could destroy the ethical credibility of the European project. What is ultimately at stake 
here is the model of political representation and the conception of European society 
currently under construction. The challenge is amplified by the fact that European 
governance has always made the interweaving of private and public interests one of its 
salient characteristics. The rapprochement between some of the demands of the alter-
European movement – notably in the fields of ethics and transparency – and the political 
policies laid down by EU institutions is opening up a critical period for the future: a 
period that will provide vital indications of Europe‟s capacity to meet the aspirations of 
those calling for a more virtuous democracy. 
 
NOTES 
 
1. Examples include interest group representatives masquerading as parliamentarians, and the theft 
and/or sale of official documents. 
2. Lobbyists were considered as, “Anybody who acts on the instruction of a third party and set out to 
defend the interests of that third party to the European parliament and other Community institutions or who 
regularly distributes information or arranges or maintains regular contacts for that purpose with MEPs and 
staff working within the institution” (European Parliament, 1992: 3). 
3. These provisions now constitute the basis of the Rules of Procedure of the European Parliament in 
the relevant domains. Cf. „Annex I: Provisions governing the application of Rule 9(1) – Transparency and 
Members‟ financial interests‟ and „Annex IX: Provisions governing the application of Rule 9(4) – 
Lobbying in Parliament‟ (European Parliament, 2008: 100 and 133-4). 
4. Only the names of the organization and its representative(s) are mentioned. A slightly more 
comprehensive print version containing the group‟s address and corporate name is obtainable at the 
Parliament. 
5. Each group can be represented by a maximum of six people. 
6. This was confirmed to the author during an interview in May 2004 with Wilhelm Lehman, 
European functionary and co-author of a report on lobbying regulation in EU member states (European 
Parliament, 2003). 
7. In 2005 the required submission was more detailed and demanding, calling for proof of the 
applicant‟s identity. Above all the Parliament would accredit only groups with an address in Brussels; this 
constituted a major filter and contributed to the formation of a „political centre.‟ 
8. Under the terms of Rule 24 of the Parliament‟s Rules of Procedure, the Conference of Presidents 
is in charge of parliamentary commissions and relations with third parties (European Parliament, 2008: 22). 
9. Before this measure was taken, the level of opacity was such that there was no way of knowing 
their exact number, but estimates from different sources vary from 50 to over 80. 
10. Among them were the Friendship with Taiwan, Friendship with the Hebrew State, and Pro-Arab 
intergroups (Dutoit, 2001: 45). This measure was important in that it showed how supervision of interest 
groups took the form of limitation of their fields of competence to the benefit of the EU, which gradually 
appropriated the influence they formerly exercised. It is clear here that the conduct of a European foreign 
policy and its influence on the interplay of international relations – both of which had gained considerably 
in strength in the preceding few years – had difficulty in coming to terms with the activities in the same 
field by hard-to-control groups of MEPs.  
11. In September 2005, 24 intergroups were officially registered. 
12. The obstacle course begins with the Kafkaesque business of getting permission to enter the 
Parliament. To receive a pass, the ordinary citizen must first be invited by a European functionary, who 
vouches for his or her behavior. Inside the building the citizen is supposed to be accompanied at every 
moment, as a rule by the person with whom he has an appointment. Finally he must consult the documents 
that interest him wherever he can find room to do so, as there is no space set aside for this. Photocopying 
being strictly forbidden, there is no choice but to copy out by hand the information sought. All this 
demonstrates that while a policy of transparency is certainly to be evaluated in terms of the general 
principles mentioned, it must also, and above all, be assessed in terms of its practical application. 
13. All studies show that, indirectly or not, the member states remain the most influential actors in 
European governance. 
14. Here we find both the Commission and civil society actors faced with the classic dilemma: 
representational capability or operational efficacy? The more organized a group – or an institution –  the 
more expertise and credibility it enjoys and the more its members tend to feel cut off from their 
representatives (March and Olsen, 1998).  
15. The Commission subsequently decided to create a new voluntary register for interest 
representatives, which was launched in June 2008 (see below); as this chapter was being drafted, the 
CONECCS database was closed. 
16. It should be emphasized, however, that as CONECCS dealt with NGOS, it revealed nothing about 
financial interest groups or business consultancies. 
17. In this respect we should mention the collective resignation of the Commission under Jacques 
Santer on 15 March 1999, in response to accusations of fraud, administrative incompetence and nepotism 
leveled at four Commissioners. While open to interpretation as a sign of ignominy and bankruptcy, this act 
also – and perhaps above all – testifies to the Commission‟s sense of responsibility, and more broadly to the 
determination of EU institutions to be judged according to principles and political morality. So far no 
national government faced with a political/financial scandal has reacted in the same way.  
18. See, for instance, Corporate Europe Observatory (2005) which follows the Lonely Planet 
guidebook model, providing a very comprehensive set of indications on the geography of the main interest 
groups in Brussels and using their cartography to stress their nearness to European institutions, and 
Corporate Europe Observatory (2007) which highlights an annual „Worst EU Lobby Award‟ for a group 
using tactics regarded as especially unacceptable.   
19. The Union of Industrial and Employers‟ Confederations of Europe (UNICE) [which changed its 
name in 2007 to BUSINESSEUROPE] long proceeded in a similar fashion, preferring a weak presence on 
the European scene so as not to encourage implementation of the Social Dialogue procedure while 
continuing to decentralize and multiply its negotiation venues. 
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